In a seminal work, Boneh, Sahai and Waters (BSW, for short) [TCC'11] showed that for functional encryption the indistinguishability notion of security (IND-Security) is weaker than simulation-based security (SIM-Security), and that SIM-Security is in general impossible to achieve. This has opened up the door to a plethora of papers showing feasibility and new impossibility results. Nevertheless, the quest for better definitions that (1) overcome the limitations of IND-Security and (2) the impossibility result of BSW, is still open.
Previous Works
Results about functional encryption now live in a high-dimensional space, where there are many parameters and several results ruling out or constructing schemes for certain parameters. Before presenting these results, summarized in Table 1 , to make things clear, following [DIJ + 13] notation, we define (q 1 , , q 2 )-atk-Security, where q 1 = q 1 (λ), = (λ), q 2 = q 2 (λ) are either polynomials in the security parameter λ that are fixed a priori or equal to the formal variable poly, and atk ∈ {IND, SIM}, as follows. Specifically, atk-Security holds for adversaries A that issues at most q 1 non-adaptive keygeneration queries, output challenge message vectors of length at most , and furthermore issues at most q 2 adaptive key-generation queries, and in the case that a parameter equals the formal variable poly it is meant that there is no fixed bound (the only bound is the running time of the adversary that is polynomial). Thus, for example, if q 1 and are polynomials then (q 1 , , poly)-SIM-Security means that the adversary in the SIM-Security definition makes a q 1 (λ)-bounded number of non-adaptive keygeneration queries but an unbounded (i.e., bounded only by its running time) number of adaptive key-generation queries, and outputs a (λ)-bounded challenge message vector, where λ is the security parameter. If the parameters are not specified we intend them set to poly. (IND-Security is defined in Section 2, Definition 2.3. As reference for SIM-Security, we take the definitions of [DIJ + 13] and [BSW11] , that we report, for reader convenience, in Appendix B.) We will also consider in our work the selective security model which is a weaker security model (see, e.g., [BB11, GPSW06, AFV11] ) in which the adversary must commit to its challenge messages before seeing the public parameters. Then, we will use the notation sel-atk to mean atk-Security in the selective model. In the seminal work of Boneh, Sahai and Waters [BSW11] , it was shown that for FE, unlike classical encryption, IND-Security is weaker than SIM-Security. Indeed, the authors show a clearly insecure FE scheme that is provably IND-Secure. Moreover, in the same work Boneh et al. show that (0, poly, 2)-SIM-Security is impossible to achieve even for a simple functionality like IBE in the nonprogrammable oracle model, but prove, in the random oracle model, that (poly, poly, poly)-IND-Security implies (poly, poly, poly)-SIM-Security for predicate encryption with public-index, and there exists an AIBE scheme that is (poly, poly, poly)-SIM-Secure. At the same time, O'Neill [O'N10] does similar considerations and shows that for pre-image sampleable functionalities, (poly, poly, 0)-IND-Security is equivalent to (poly, poly, 0)-SIM-Secure. Barbosa and Farshim [BF13] extended O'Neill's equivalence between indistinguishability and semantic security to the adaptive setting by restricting the adversary to issue adaptive key-generation queries for keys that are constant over the support of the message distribution. We will not consider any of such restrictions but we stress that our positive results are for a model that does not share these limitations. Later, Bellare and O'Neill [BO13] show that the impossibility result of [BSW11] also extends to the standard model assuming the existence of collision resistant hash functions. Furthermore, new definitions were introduced with the aim of overcoming the impossibility results. Specifically, they define a new notion equivalent to IND-Security and thus incurring in the same deficiency, and a new simulation-based definition for which a proof of security was only shown for functionalities with key space of polynomial size (and so not including basic functionalities like IBE). In 2012, Gorbunov et al. [GVW12a] presented a construction of FE for general circuits that is (q 1 , poly, 0)-SIM-Secure. Following, Agrawal et al. [AGVW13] proved an impossibility result showing that it is impossible to achieve (poly, 1, 0)-SIM-Security. Their result does not hold in the selective security model 1 and for public-index functionalities. Furthermore, in the same paper, the authors prove that (poly, 1, poly)-IND-Security implies (poly, poly, poly)-IND-Security, and propose a simulation-based notion of security that considers computational unbounded simulator as a way to overcome current impossibility results, leaving many open problems about this definition. Last year, Goldwasser et al. [GKP + 13] presented an FE for general circuits with succinct ciphertexts (meaning that the size of the ciphertext does grow only with the respect of the depth of the circuits to be evaluated) provable (q 1 , poly, 0)-SIM-secure. Later BCP13] proposed the first candidate constructions for a (poly, poly, poly)-IND-Secure 2 functional encryption scheme for general circuits from indistinguishable obfuscation and extractable obfuscation.
Concurrently and independently from our work, Agrawal et al.. [AAB + 13] studied new definitions for functional encryption. Although part of their work focuses on function privacy (another property not addressed in our work), one of the definitions it contains, therein called RELAX-AD-SIM, is similar in spirit to ours. Loosely speaking, in RELAX-AD-SIM, the simulator is allowed to run in unbounded time and make more queries than the adversary but in a controlled way. See the rest of the paper for a deeper discussion and comparison.
Our Work
Why yet another definition? Given the current state of the affair in functional encryption, as shown in the previous section, the reader can be then tempted to ask why a new definition should be considered in this already messy scenario. We believe then the quest for a reasonable simulation-based security definition is still open and that connections with secure computation and zero-knowledge are relevant to better understand, then clarify, what is happening in functional encryption.
For instance, in the context of secure computation, Backes et al. in [BMQU07] present a protocol that can be proven secure using a rewinding simulator and that is not secure for any non-rewinding simulator. Moreover they show that stand-alone security (where rewinding simulators are allowed) do not coincide with the notion of security under concurrent composition whose security guarantees are relevant in practice.
With the above in mind, in this paper, we explore the power of efficient rewinding black-box simulators in the context of functional encryption as a way to overcome the known impossibility results and nevertheless establish composition theorems to show that one-message security is equivalent to manymessage security at the least for functionalities of interest. Notice that composition when considering rewinding simulators has been already shown to be problematic by [PRS02, Lin08, BMQU07] .
Specifically, so far, all the known simulation-based security definitions for functional encryption share a common characteristic. They all constraint the simulator to learn exactly what the adversary learns in a single run of the experiment. This is enforced by requiring straight-line simulators and/or by having the challenger of the experiment tracing the queries issued by the adversary and reporting them in the output distribution of the experiment. This is true also for the BSW definition which nevertheless allows the simulator to rewind the adversary to reconstruct its view. We, then, allow the simulator to learn not only what the adversary learns in a single run of the experiment but also what can be extracted by rewinding the adversary multiple times under the condition that: (1) the simulator must be efficient, (2) the simulator can not learn more than what the adversary would learn in any run of the experiment. All that is needed is for the simulator to present to the distinguisher, at the end of the interaction, with a complete view of the adversary that is indistinguishable from the view the adversary produces in a single run of the experiment. In particular, by rewinding, we mean that the simulator runs parts of the adversary during the simulation and produces a fragment of the conversation that has some desired property with a certain probability. For some functionalities, if the simulator fails then it possibly gains some additional information on the challenge messages useful to produce a successful simulation and then can rewind the adversary based on this new information.
Does the rewinding simulator learn too much information? A matter of concern regarding rewinding strategies could be that the simulator is leaking too much information or it is trivial. If the 2 Precisely, the functional encryption scheme of [ simulator could rewind the adversary to its liking, we would have the undesired situation that insecure schemes could be secure. Therefore, we have to constrain the power of the simulator: it must learn information but in a controlled way. We make this as follows. The simulator can rewind based on the adversary's queries. If those queries allow the adversary to learn information on the challenge messages, then the simulator learns this information by rewinding too. Otherwise, the simulator can simulate the view for the adversary easily, without learning much information. We control the power of the simulator by allowing it to ask only queries that the adversary would ask during a valid run of the experiment. More concretely, consider the different constraints on the simulator in BSW and in our definition. In BSW, the simulator is given direct access to the functionality oracle and so to make the definition not trivial the list of the queries is put in the transcript (otherwise the simulator could just query the functionality oracle on the identity function to get the challenge message and simulate perfectly any scheme even insecure ones). Instead, in our definition, when the adversary makes a query k, the simulator is invoked with the value F (k, x), where x is the challenge message, but the simulator can not ever ask a query for a key k that the adversary would not ask in a run of the game. Is this sufficient?
As sanity check, we show that, although the simulator has this extra power, the new definition still implies IND-Security. Nevertheless, it seems to not suffer from the problems of IND-Security (such as the existence of clearly insecure schemes that satisfy such definition).
In an independent and concurrent work, Agrawal et al. [AAB + 13] formulated a new definition called RELAX-AD-SIM to the scope of bypassing the impossibility results for previous SIM-Security and of not being vulnerable to the weakness of IND-Security. Interestingly, both our definition and RELAX-AD-SIM share the same intuition and spirit. In RELAX-AD-SIM, the simulator can learn more information than the adversary but this leak is controlled in the following way (this is an oversimplification for the scope of our presentation, see their paper for details). Fix a value and consider the set of queries Q that the adversary would ask with probability greater than . Then, the simulator of RELAX-AD-SIM can ask any query in Q . Moreover, their simulator is allowed to run in time inversely proportional to 1/ and it is only required that the distinguisher can not have distinguishing advantage (between the real and ideal world) greater than . The reader may notice that this mechanism of giving extra power to the simulator in a constrained way is similar to ours. In fact, if our efficient simulator can learn some extra query by means of rewinding then it means that the adversary is likely to ask such query, and their simulator could query it as well.
Efficient simulation with non-negligible distinguishing advantage.
A technical difference between our work and [AAB + 13]'s work is that [AAB + 13] allows the simulator to run in time polynomial in 1/ and thus it would run in super-polynomial time when is smaller than the inverse of any polynomial, whereas we stick to efficient simulation and impose a distinguishing advantage at most inverse of any polynomial. Notwithstanding, in our work efficient simulation is sufficient to bypass the impossibility result of BSW and show the achievability of practical primitives like (Anonymous) IBE, inner-product over Z 2 , NC 0 circuits, and monotone conjunctive Boolean formulae (see next section for an overview of our positive results). We stress that most of our results are equivalence between INDSecurity and our RSIM-Security. This shows that for very important primitives there are no pathological schemes, a fact that was conjectured in BSW. Instead, their work mainly concerns concrete constructions and, moreover, function privacy whereas we do not address this further orthogonal property. We point out that their work also contains another interesting definition that shows the achievability of a very strong form of simulation-based security but in the generic group model.
Our Results. In Section 3, we put forth a weaker notion of simulation-based security that we call rewinding simulation-based security (RSIM, for short), that lies between SIM-Security and IND-Security. Our definition is a weakening of previous definitions proposed in literature (See Appendix B for these definitions). We allow the simulator to rewind the adversary as in the original BSW definition, but with the main difference being that we allow the simulator to learn not just what the adversary learns in a single run of the experiment but in multiple runs. All that is needed is for the simulator to present to the distinguisher, at the end of the interaction, with a complete view of the adversary that is indistinguishable from the view the adversary produces in a single run of the experiment. Meaning that, the distinguisher will see only the transcript of a successful execution of the adversary. Indeed, our rewinding strategy is weaker than that of BSW, that forces the simulator to learn exactly what the adversary learns in a single run of the experiment, and let us overcome the [BSW11, BO13]'s impossibility result (More on this in Section 3 where we introduce RSIM and discuss relations with the other definitions).
Positive results. In Section 4 and E, we show that in the standard model for efficient rewinding black-box simulators, (poly, poly, poly)-IND-Security implies (poly, poly, poly)-RSIM-Security, for predicate encryption with public-index, for predicate encryption with private-index for specific functionalities, namely Anonymous IBE, Inner-Product over Z 2 and Monotone Conjunctive Boolean Formulae. Thus, establishing equivalence between (poly, poly, poly)-IND-Security and (poly, poly, poly)-RSIMSecurity. For the above functionalities we can also show that composition holds, meaning that singlemessage security implies many-massage security which is relevant in real scenarios.
Additionally, we prove, in Section E. 4 , that the brute-force construction of [BW07, BSW11] is (poly, poly, poly)-RSIM-Secure in the standard model assuming only the IND-CPA security of the underlying public-key encryption scheme whereas [BSW11] showed that a slightly modified variant of the [BW07] scheme can be proven (poly, poly, poly)-SIM-Secure in the random oracle, and [BO13] proved its (poly, poly, poly)-SIM-Security in the standard model assuming that the underlying PKE scheme is also secure against selective opening key attack.
We recall that in all the above settings the [AGVW13]'s impossibility result does not hold. 
where K is the key space, X is the message space and Σ is the output space and ⊥ is a special string not contained in Σ. Notice that the functionality is undefined for when either the key is not in the key space or the message is not in the message space. Furthermore we require that there are efficient procedures to check membership of a string in the message space and key space and to sample from these spaces. 1. Setup(1 λ ) outputs public and master secret keys (Mpk, Msk) for security parameter λ. 2. KeyGen(Msk, k), on input a master secret key Msk and key k ∈ K outputs secret key Sk k . 3. Enc(Mpk, x), on input public key Mpk and message x ∈ X outputs ciphertext Ct; 4. Eval(Mpk, Ct, Sk k ) outputs y ∈ Σ ∪ {⊥}.
In addition we make the following correctness requirement: for all (Mpk, Msk) ← Setup(1 λ , 1 n ), all k ∈ K n and m ∈ M n , for Sk ← KeyGen(Msk, k) and Ct ← Enc(Mpk, m), we have that Eval(Mpk, Ct, Sk) = F (k, m) whenever F (k, m) = ⊥ 4 , except with negligible probability.
The empty key. For any functionality, we also assume that the key space contains a special empty key such that F ( , x) gives the length of x and (depending on the functionality) some intentionally leaked information on x that can be easily extracted from an encryption of x. When x = (x 1 , . . . , x ) is a vector of messages, for any k ∈ K ∪{ }, we denote by
Further parametrizations. In general, the key space, the message space and the functionality itself are families of sets and functions indexed by the security parameter λ ∈ N. Specifically, a functionality F is a family of functions F = {F λ : K λ ×X λ → Σ λ ∪{⊥}} λ where {K λ } λ is the key space family, {X λ } λ is the message space family and {Σ λ } λ is the output space family. It will be clear from the context which kind of formulation of functionality we adopt, whether for families or not. Thus, if functionality F is actually a family of functions, with a slight abuse of notation we will denote by F (k, x) the value F λ (k, x), where λ is the security parameter.
Secret-key length. We say that a functional encryption scheme FE = (Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Eval) has secret-key length kl(·) if |Sk| ≤ kl(λ) for all k ∈ K λ , X ∈ X λ , all (Mpk, Msk) ← Setup(1 λ ), and all Sk ← KeyGen(Msk, k). Note that every FE scheme must have some polynomial kl(·) secret-key length in order to be efficient.
Indistinguishability-based Security. The indistinguishability-based notion of security for functional encryption scheme FE = (Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Eval) for functionality F defined over (K, X) is formalized by means of the following game IND FE Adv between an adversary Adv = (Adv 0 , Adv 1 ) and a challenger C.
1. C generates (Mpk, Msk) ← Setup(1 λ ) and runs Adv 0 on input Mpk; 2. Adv 0 , during its computation, issues q 1 non-adaptive key-generation queries. C on input key k ∈ K computes Sk = KeyGen(Msk, k) and sends it to Adv 0 . When Adv 0 stops, it outputs two challenge messages vectors, of length , x 0 , x 1 ∈ X and its internal state st.
3. C picks b ∈ {0, 1} at random, and, for i ∈ , computes the challenge ciphertexts
Adv 1 that resumes its computation from st.
4. Adv 1 , during its computation, issues q 2 adaptive key-generation queries. C on input key k ∈ K computes Sk = KeyGen(Msk, k) and sends it to Adv 1 .
5. When Adv 1 stops, it outputs b .
for each k for which Adv has issued a key-generation query, then output 1 else output 0.
The advantage of adversary A is: Adv
are polynomials in the security parameter λ that are fixed a priori, if all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries Adv issuing at most q 1 non-adaptive key queries, q 2 adaptive key queries and output challenge message vectors of length and most , have at most negligible advantage in the above game. (Notice that, if q 1 (resp. q 2 ) is equal to poly, then the interpretation is that there is no bound on the number of non-adaptive (resp. adaptive) key-generation queries and if = poly there is no bound on the length of the challenge message vector).
Predicate Encryption (PE, for short).
Those schemes are defined for functionalities whose message space X consists of two subspaces I and M called respectively index space and payload space. In this case, the functionality F is defined in terms of a polynomial-time predicate P : K × I → {0, 1} as follows: F (k, (ind, m)) = m if P (k, ind) = 1, ⊥ otherwise, where k ∈ K, ind ∈ I and m ∈ M . In particular, for the key, we have F ( , (ind, m)) = (|ind|, |m|). As for general functionalities, a predicate P can be a family of predicates and in this case the functionality F defined in terms of P is a family of functions. Indistinguishable Security for PE is defined analogously to Definition 2.3.
Anonymous IBE (AIBE, for short). Let the key space K n = {0, 1} n , index space I n = {0, 1} n and payload space M n = {0, 1} n the payload space for n ∈ N. The predicate family IBE = {IBE n : K n × I n → {0, 1}} n∈N is defined so that for any k ∈ K n , ind ∈ I n , IBE(k, ind) = 1 if and only if k = ind. We call a predicate encryption scheme (with private-index) for this predicate Anonymous IBE .
Predicate Encryption with Public-Index (a.k.a. ABE) (PIPE, for short). In this type of FE the empty key explicitly reveals the index ind, namely F ( , (ind, m)) = (ind, |m|). Indistinguishable security is defined again analogously to Definition 2.3, with the main difference being in the adversary's challenge, namely it consists of two payloads m 0 , m 1 andan index ind. An example of PIPE is Identitybased Encryption.
Rewinding Simulation-based Security
In this section, we present our rewinding simulation-based security definition. Definition 3.1 [Rewinding Simulation-based Security] Let q 1 = q 1 (λ), = (λ), q 2 = q 2 (λ) be specific polynomials in the security parameter λ that are fixed a priori or be equal to the formal variable poly. A functional encryption scheme FE = (Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Eval) for functionality F defined over (K, X) is (q 1 , , q 2 )-rewinding simulation-secure ((q 1 , , q 2 )-RSIM-Secure, for short), if for any polynomial ν(λ) there exists a PPT simulator algorithm Sim = (Sim 0 , Sim 1 ) such that for all PPT adversary algorithms Adv = (Adv 0 , Adv 1 ), issuing at most q 1 non-adaptive key-generation queries, q 2 adaptive key-generation queries and output challenge message vector of length and most , no PPT distinguisher can distinguish the outputs of the following two experiments with advantage greater than 1/ν(λ). (Note that, if q 1 (resp. q 2 ) is set to poly, then the interpretation is that there is no bound on the number of non-adaptive (resp. adaptive) key-generation queries and if = poly there is no bound on the length of the challenge message vector).
Here, the (k i ∈ K) i∈[q 1 ] 's are the q 1 keys for which Adv 0 has issued a non-adaptive key-generation query to its key-generation oracle. In the ideal experiment Adv 1 is provided with a special oracle O for adaptive key-generation queries. The oracle O takes in input a key k ∈ K and answers the query in the following way. The oracle invokes the simulator Sim 1 on input (k, F (k, x)). Sim 1 outputs a secret key for k that the oracle returns to Adv 1 . We require the simulator Sim = (Sim 0 , Sim 1 ) to be stateful and allow Sim 0 and Sim 1 to communicate by means of a shared memory. We remark that each time Sim 0 runs the adversary Adv 1 on some input (Ct i ), Adv 1 is executed with input (Mpk, (Ct i ), st) and fresh randomness.
RSIM-Security with negligible advantage. With the obvious meaning, we say that FE is RSIMSecure with negligible advantage if in the above definition the two experiments are computationally indistinguishable, i.e. whether the function ν(λ) is negligible. Moreover, the definition could be generalized making it parametrized by a generic function ν(λ), but for our scopes this is not possible 5 . In fact, we focus on efficient simulation, and for this reason the function ν(λ) can not be set to a negligible function (see the paragraph 'The actual simulation' in theorem for an explanation). Instead, if the function ν(λ) is the inverse of an arbitrary polynomial, we can achieve efficient simulation. As said in the introduction, simulators with non-negligible advantage are also used in [AAB + 13].
Auxiliary Inputs. Our definition can be extended naturally to the auxiliary input setting, as in Bellare and O'Neill [BO13] . An auxiliary input generator algorithm Z outputs z which is given to the adversary and simulator, and included in the output distribution of security game. Notice that, the simulator is not allowed to pick z. As in [BO13] , the auxiliary input setting will be used in our impossibility result in Section 5, where z will contain a key for a collision-resistant hash function.
Selective Security. The selective security model is a weaker model in which the adversary must commit to its challenge messages before seeing the public parameters. In particular, for RSIM, in the ideal experiment the simulator will simulate also the answers to the non-adaptive key queries. We report the selective RSIM-Security definition in Appendix G.
Relations among Definitions.
Our RSIM definition stands in between SIM and IND security. Specifically, it is easy to see that SIM implies RSIM because the RSIM simulator simply runs the SIM simulator. Moreover, we show in Appendix C that RSIM-Security implies IND-Security.
Composition. Despite the fact that the RSIM simulator can rewind the adversary Adv 1 to reconstruct its view (this in general is problematic for composition), we can show that for the class of functionalities for which we prove the equivalence between (poly, poly, poly)-IND-Security and (poly, poly, poly)-RSIMSecurity, single-message RSIM-Security implies multiple-message RSIM-Security, namely (poly, 1, poly)-RSIM-Security implies (poly, poly, poly)-RSIM-Security. This is because, (poly, 1, poly)-RSIM-Security implies (poly, 1, poly)-IND-Security (by Theorem C.1 in Appendix C) and (poly, 1, poly)-IND-Security implies (poly, poly, poly)-IND-Security (this was shown by [GVW12b] ).
Relations with BSW [BSW11]
First of all, in BSW the simulator is allowed to pick its own simulated public-key and non-adaptive secret keys, whereas in our definition this information is generated honestly. Notice that the main aim of BSW was to prove impossibility results and such results are stronger if they hold with respect to more powerful simulators (i.e., simulators that can also simulate the public-and secret-keys). On the other hand, we are mainly interested to prove positive results and so our choice of the definition (i.e. the fact that the public-and non-adaptive secret-keys are generated honestly) makes our results stronger. To clarify the difference with the [BSW11] definition (See Appendix B for the formal definition), we recall the [BSW11, BO13]'s impossibility result and show why it does not hold for RSIM. Specifically, consider the following adversary Adv = (Adv 0 , Adv 1 ) for the IBE functionality. Adv 0 returns as challenge messages the vector ((0, r i )) i∈[ ] , where = kl(λ) + λ, kl is a polynomial bounding the length of secret keys, 0 is the identity and r i is a random bit for each i ∈ [ ]. Then, Adv 1 invokes its key-generation oracle on input identity w = CRHF(Mpk||Ct 1 || · · · ||Ct ) for some collisionresistant hash function CRHF, and then asks to see a secret key for identity 0. The output of Adv 1 is the transcript of its entire computation including its inputs. Thus, the strategy of the above adversary forces the simulator to commit to the challenge ciphertexts he has generated (through the query on indentity w) before seeing the evaluation of IBE functionalities on the key for identity 0 and so learning the bit r i 's. Then, the challenge ciphertexts can not be reprogrammed and by choosing the number of encrypted bits to be larger than the length of the secret key the simulator is forced to achieve an information theoretic compression of random bits which is in turn impossible. Notice that, even though the simulator in BSW definition is formally allowed to rewind the adversary, the same simulator is not allowed to learn more information than what is learnt by the adversary in a single run of experiment. This, in turn, means that the only way for the simulator to reconstruct the view of the adversary is to break the collision resistant hash function.
The strategy of this adversary is clearly not successful with the respect to RSIM because an RSIM simulator once obtained the r i 's can simply generates new ciphertexts encrypting them and rewind the adversary. In the new run, the RSIM simulator can answer all the key-generation queries by simply generating honest secret keys.
Observe that the BSW definition forbids this kind of simulation since: (1) the simulator is given direct access to the functionality oracle and (2) the key-generation queries issued by the simulator are given as input to the distinguisher. So according to the BSW definition, the distinguisher would see 4 key-generation queries, and thus it could tell apart the real experiment where the adversary always asks 2 secret keys from the ideal experiment. The same holds for the [BF13] definition. On the other hand, in RSIM the distinguisher would only see the last transcript. The definitions of [AGVW13, DIJ + 13] also forbid this kind of simulation since their simulator is straight-line.
An Equivalence for Public-Index Schemes
In this section, we show that for public-index schemes IND-Security is equivalent to RSIM-Security. In Appendix C, we have already shown that RSIM-Security implies IND-Security, therefore, the main theorem of this section is the following. Theorem 4.1 Let PIPE be an (poly, poly, poly)-IND-Secure PE scheme with public-index for predicate P : K × I → {0, 1}. Then, PIPE is (poly, poly, poly)-RSIM-Secure as well.
Overview. To give some intuitions on the proof strategy, let us start by considering a weak adversary that issues only key-generation queries for keys that can not be used to decrypt any of the challenge ciphertexts. In such a case, the simulator will generates challenge ciphertexts for random payloads and for the indices that the simulator gets in input (recall that we are considering public-index functionalities). It is clear that under the IND-Security of the PIPE scheme the adversary can not notice any difference given the fact that all the requested secret keys can not decrypt any of the challenge ciphertexts. Now, let consider an adversary that issue, after having seen the challenge ciphertexts, a key-generation query for a key that decrypts one of the these challenge ciphertexts, let say Ct i (Notice that up to this moment the simulation is perfect under the IND-Security of the PIPE scheme). Because the challenge ciphertexts were made for random payloads, the output of the Eval algorithm will be different from what the adversary expects, meaning that the simulation of current run is not successful. But now notice that the simulator learns the payload corresponding to Ct i , m i . Then, the simulator can executes a new run of the adversary generating Ct i for the correct payload. Notice that, from now, no key-generation query for a key that decrypts Ct i will not cause a rewind anymore.
Remark. The above is an oversimplified sketch. In fact, if the simulator follows this strategy it produces a biased output. Anyway, henceforth, we prefer to first present the simplified simulation and then explain why is biased and finally we proceed to fix it. We think that presenting the security reductions in this way helps the reader in understating the need of all the details. We will follow this approach for the rest of the work.
Proof: (Simplified simulation.) Our simulator Sim = (Sim 0 , Sim 1 ) works as follows. Sim 0 takes in input the master public and secret key, the list Q = (k i , Sk k i , F (k i , x)) i∈[q 1 ] , and the intentionally leaked information about the challenge messages F ( , x) = (ind j , |m j |) j∈[ ] . Then, for each i ∈ [q 1 ], Sim 0 checks whatever P (k i , ind j ) = 1 for some j ∈ [ ]. If it is the case, then Sim 0 learns m j . Furthermore, let X the tuple of messages (indices with the relative payloads) learnt by Sim 0 . Then, for each pair in X , Sim 0 generates a normal ciphertext by invoking the encryption algorithm. For all the other indices for which Sim 0 was not able to learn the corresponding payload, Sim 0 generates ciphertexts for those indices having a random payload. Let x be the resulting message vector that the simulator used to produce the challenge ciphertexts.
Then, Sim 0 executes Adv 1 on input the so generated challenge ciphertexts. When Adv 1 invokes its key-generation oracle on input key k, Sim 1 is asked to generate a corresponding secret key given k and F (k, x). Now we have two cases:
Then, Sim learns m j . If m j was already known by Sim, it means that the corresponding challenge ciphertext was well formed when Sim 0 invoked Adv 1 . Then Sim 1 generates the secret key for k (using the master secret key) and the simulation continues. On the other hand, if Sim 0 didn't know m j then the ciphertext corresponding to ind j was for a random message. Therefore, Sim 0 must halt Adv 1 and rewinds it. Sim 0 adds (ind j , m j ) to X (and thus updates x ) and with this new knowledge Sim 0 rewinds Adv 1 on input the encryption of the new ciphertexts (i.e., the encryption of the new x ). The above reasoning easily extends to the case that P (k, ind j ) = 1 for more than one j.
In this case, a secret key for k can not be used to decrypt any of the challenge ciphertexts. Then, Sim 1 generates the secret key for k (using the master secret key) and the simulation continues.
If at some point the adversary halts giving some output the simulator outputs what the adversary outputs. This conclude the description of the simulator Sim.
It remains to show that the simulated challenge ciphertexts does not change Adv 1 's behaviour significantly. We call a key-generation query good if the simulator can answer such query without rewinding the adversary according to the previous rules. We call a completed execution of the adversary between two rewinds of the adversary a run. First, notice that the number of runs, meaning the number of times the simulator rewinds, is upper-bounded by the number of challenge messages that is polynomial in the security parameter. In fact, each time that a query is not good and the simulator needs to rewind then the simulator learn a new pair (ind j , m j ), for some j ∈ [ ] and the same query will never cause a rewind anymore. In the last run, that in which all the key-generation queries are good, the view of the adversary is indistinguishable from that in the real game. This follows from the IND-Security of PIPE.
In fact, the evaluations of the secret keys on the challenge ciphertexts in the real experiment give the same values than the evaluation of the simulated secret keys on the simulated ciphertexts in the ideal experiment since the secret keys are generated honestly. Therefore, the IND-Security guarantees that in this case the view in the real experiment is indistinguishable from that in the ideal experiment.
The actual simulation. The previous simulation incurs in the following problem: the output of the simulator could be biased. Consider for example an adversary that with probability 1/3 does not ask any query and with probability 2/3 asks a query that triggers a rewind, and outputs its computation.
In the real experiment the transcript contains zero queries with probability 1/3 whereas the output of the ideal experiment contains zero queries with probability larger than 1/3, thus with non-negligible difference 6 . Above, we have shown that the last transcript of the simulator would be indinstiguishable from the transcript of the adversary in the real experiment but this final output could be biased and corresponds to different runs of the adversary. Thus, we need the following more smart strategy. First, recall that by standard use of Chernoff's bound we can estimate a (β, γ)-approximation of a random variable, where the estimate is β-close with probability 1 − γ. Moreover, this can be made by sampling the random variable a number of times that is polynomial in 1/β and logarithmic in 1/γ. Let µ be some fixed negligible function and ν be the the distinguishing advantage we wish to achieve (see Definition 3). Let i = 0 to , the simulator makes the following. Consider the experiment X i in which the simulator executes the adversary in a run where the information it learnt consists of the pairs (ind j , m j ) for j = 1, . . . , i, and we assume that for i = 0 the simulator starts the run with random pairs. The run is executed as described in the simplified simulation, where if the adversary triggers a rewind then the simulator outputs a dummy value, otherwise the simulator outputs what the adversary outputs. We denote by p i the probability that in experiment X i the adversary triggers a rewind. Setting ν = ν 1/2 / , the simulator computes a (ν , δ)-estimatep i for p i for some negligible function δ (the reason for setting ν to such value will be clear at the end of the analysis). If the estimatep i ≤ µ, then the simulator executes the adversary in experiment X i and if the adversary terminates without triggering a rewind, the simulator outputs what the adversary outputs, otherwise the simulator outputs a dummy value. Instead, if the estimate is greater than µ, then simulator increments i and proceeds to next step. Let us compute the advantage of a PPT distinguisher in telling apart the real from the ideal experiment. By assumption on the estimate and by construction of the simulator, the output of the simulator is the output of the adversary in experiment X 1 with probability at most w 1 = (1−δ)(µ+ν ) and is the output of the adversary in experiment X 2 with probability at most a 2 (1−δ)(µ+ν ), where a 2 = 1−q 1 < 1, and so forth. Therefore, the output of the simulator is the output of the adversary in experiment X i with probability at most (1 − δ)(µ + ν ). If the output of the simulator equals the output of the adversary in experiment X i , then the distinguishing advantage is at most ν up to some negligible factor. Indeed, if the adversary does not trigger a rewind the two experiment are computationally indistinguishable by the IND-Security and in experiment X i the adversary triggers a rewind with probability at most µ + ν and µ is negligible. By definition of ν , it follows that the overall advantage is at most ν 2 = ν up to a negligible factor.
Impossibility of RSIM for FE for General Circuits
In this section, we show that RSIM-Security with negligible advantage can not be achieved in the adaptive setting for general circuits.
Theorem 5.1 Assuming the existence of collision resistance hash functions and pseudo-random functions, there exists a family of circuits for which there are no functional encryption schemes that are (0, poly, 1)-RSIM-Secure with negligible advantage in the auxiliary input setting (for the standard model).
Overview. To prove the theorem, it is enough to present an adversary whose strategy is such that at any run the simulator is forced to rewind, meaning that the information gathered in any run are useless to successfully simulate any other run. To force the rewind, our adversary will use a [BSW11, BO13]-like strategy. Namely, our adversary will first force the simulator to commit to the challenge ciphertexts he has generated by using a collision resistant hash function. Then, our adversary will request to see a secret key that extracts from the challenge ciphertexts a (psuedo-)random string whose length is much larger then the length of the secret key itself. Because it is information-theoretical impossible to compress such (psuedo-)random string in the space provided by the secret key, the simulator will rewind hoping to use the information gathered so far to successfully simulate the next run. Now notice that in the [BSW11, BO13]'s impossibility results for the IBE functionality, only the first run can not be successfully simulated. In fact, in the the same run the simulator learns the challenge messages, which remains the same in all the runs, and can successfully simulate the next run. Thus, the IBE functionality is of limited use. Therefore, we have to consider a functionality that let the adversary extracts a pseudo-random string from the challenge ciphertets, this is to invoke the information-theoretical argument that will force the simulator to rewind, and at the same time makes this string useless to simulate the next run, meaning that the output of the functionality crucially depends on the challenge ciphertexts generated by the simulator. Here is where the pseudo-random functions come in.
In more details, we consider an adversary that issues a suitable number of challenge messages, let us say kl(λ) + λ, where kl(·) is the polynomial bounding the length of the secret keys, of the type (s||r i ) i∈[ ] where s will be the seed of the pseudo-random function and r i a random value that will be part of the input on which the pseudo-random function will be evaluated. Then the adversary, on input Mpk and the ciphertexts (Ct i ) i∈[ ] for the challenge messages, issues a single adaptive key-generation query to its oracle for the circuit C PRF,w that computes the pseudo-random function on input seed s and value r||w, where w = CRHF(Mpk||Ct 1 || · · · ||Ct ) is hardwired in C PRF,w and is used to commit the simulator to the ciphertexts it has generated. Crucial is the fact that the output of C PRF,w on the challenge messages depends on the Ct i 's.
We prove Theorem 5.1 in Appendinx F. 
of (l(λ), L(λ))-pseudo-random function family if:
• Efficiently computable:
• Pseudo-random: For any p.p.t adversary A, it holds that:
where R(l(λ), L(λ)) is the space of all possible functions F : {0, 1} l(λ) → {0, 1} L(λ) .
A.2 Collision-resistant hash functions
Definition A.2 A collision-resistant hash function family CRHF = {CRHF λ : {0, 1} λ × D λ → R λ } λ∈N for |R λ | < |D λ | is a
collection of functions satisfying:
• There is a PPT algorithm K that on input 1 λ outputs a random key hk ∈ {0, 1} λ .
• There is a deterministic polynomial time algorithm H that for any λ on input a key hk ∈ {0, 1} λ and x ∈ D λ outputs CRHF(hk, x) = CRHF λ (hk, x).
• For any PPT algorithm A,
is negligible in λ.
B [BSW11] and [DIJ + 13] Simulation-Based Definitions
Notation. A B(·) [[x] ] means that the algorithm A can issue a query q to its oracle, at which point B(q, x) will be executed and output a pair (y, x ). The value y is then communicated to A as the response to its query, and the variable x is set to x , and this updated value is fed to the algorithm B the next time it is queried as an oracle, and fed to any algorithms executed later in an experiment that want x as an input. Also, A B • (·) means that A can send a query q to its oracle, at which point B • (q) is executed, and any oracle queries that B makes are answered by A. 
Here, the (k i )'s correspond to the key-generation queries of the adversary. Further, oracle O(·) is the second stage of the simulator, namely algorithm Sim 1 (Msk, st , ·, ·). Algorithm Sim 1 receives as third argument a key k j for which the adversary queries a secret key, and as fourth argument the output value F (k j , m). Further, note that the simulator algorithm Sim 1 is stateful in that after each invocation, it updates the state st which is carried over to its next invocation.
C RSIM-Security =⇒ IND-Security Theorem C.1 Let FE be a functional encryption scheme that is RSIM-Secure, then FE is IND-Secure as well. • B b 0 , on input master public key Mpk and having oracle access to the keygeneration oracle, invokes A 0 on input Mpk and emulates A 0 's key-generation oracle by using its own oracle. When A 0 stops, it outputs two challenge messages vectors, of length , x 0 , x 1 ∈ X and its internal state st. 
be an experiment identical to the IND-Security experiment except that the challenger always encrypts challenge vector x b (instead of choosing one of the two challenges at random). Then, it holds that for any function (λ) that is inverse of a polynomial:
where, more specifically: holds because if A breaks the IND-Security of FE, then with all but negligible probability, the queries issued by A (and thus by B) are such that F (k, x 0 ) = F (k, x 1 ) for any key k for which A has issued a key-generation query. 
IdealExp
for a negligible function ν.
In our positive results we use the following result.
The functionality inner-product over Z 2 7 is PS.
E Positive Results for PE with Private-Index
In this section we go further showing equivalences for PE with private-index for several functionalities including Anonymous IBE, inner-product over Z 2 , monotone conjunctive Boolean formulae, and the existence of RSIM-Secure schemes for all classes of NC 0 circuits. As before, because in Appendix C, we show that RSIM-Security implies IND-Security, to establish the equivalence for the functionalities we study, it is enough to prove the other direction, namely that IND-Security implies RSIM-Security.
Abstracting the properties needed by the simulator. A closer look at the proof of theorem 4.1 hints some abstract properties that a predicate has to satisfy in order for the simulator to be able to produce an indistinguishable view. We identify the following two properties. The execution of the simulator is divided in runs. At run j, the simulator invokes the adversary on input a ciphertext for message x j , whereas the adversary chose x, and keeps the invariant that x j gives the same results than x respect to the queries asked by the adversary until that run. At some point the adversary asks a query k for which F (k, x) = F (k, x j ) = ⊥ thus the simulator is not able to answer the query in this run. But if the functionality has the property (1) that it is easy to pre-sample a new value x j+1 that satisfies all queries including the new one, the simulator can rewind the adversary this time on input an encryption of value x j+1 . This is still not sufficient since there is no bound on the maximum number of rewinds needed by the simulator so we have to require the property (2) to force the simulation progresses towards a maximum.
To give a clear example, consider how a simulator could work for Anonymous IBE. Suppose that the adversary chooses as challenge identity crypto and the simulator chooses aaaaa as simulated identity for the ciphertext the simulator will pass to the adversary. Then, the adversary issues a query for identity bbbbb and the simulator learns that the predicate is not satisfied against, so the query gives the same evaluation on both the challenge identity and the simulated identity. This is coherent with the query, so the simulator can continue the simulation. Now, suppose that the adversary issues the query for identity crypto. Then, the simulated identity is no more compatible with the new query and the simulator has to rewind the adversary but, since the simulator has learnt the challenge identity crypto and the corresponding payload exactly, in the next run the simulator is able to finish the simulation perfectly. This simulation strategy is simplified, and as we explained in Section 4 the simulator also need to guarantee that the output is not biased. In Section E.2, we show how to implement a more complicated strategy for the predicate inner-product over Z 2 .
E.1 Equivalence for Anonymous IBE
The following theorem is an extension of Theorem 4.1.
Theorem E.1 Let AIBE be an Anonymous IBE scheme (poly, poly, poly)-IND-Secure. Then, AIBE is (poly, poly, poly)-RSIM-Secure as well.
Intuition. Notice that, in an Anonymous IBE scheme the ciphertext does not leak the identity for which it has been generated and thus the special key does not provide this information as for a public-index scheme. Despite this, when the adversary issues a key-generation query for a key k such that F (k, x) =⊥, then the simulator learns that x is a message for index (or identity for the case of AIBE) k and payload F (k, x) . Thus, the simulator rewinds the adversary on input a freshly generated ciphertext for that pair and can safely generate an honest secret key for k upon request.
Another important difference with the proof of Theorem 4.1 is that the simulator could be forced to rewind without gaining any new knowledge and this could result in a never ending simulation. This happens for example in the following case: Let x a challenge message chosen by the adversary and let x the message chosen by the simulator to simulate the ciphertext for x. Then, if the adversary issues a key-generation query for key k such that F (k, x) =⊥ but F (k, x ) =⊥, then the simulator is forced to rewind without gaining any new knowledge and this could happen indefinitely. But, the IND-Security of AIBE scheme guarantees that such situation can happen only with negligible probability, and thus the simulator can just abort in such cases.
Proof: (Simplified simulation.) Our simulator Sim = (Sim 0 , Sim 1 ) works as follows. Sim 0 takes in input the master public and secret key, the list
, and the intentionally leaked information about the challenge messages
If it is the case, then Sim 0 learns that message x j is for identity ind j = k i and payload
Let X the set of tuple of the following form (j, ind j , m j ) learnt by Sim 0 . Then, for each pair in X , Sim 0 generates a normal ciphertext for message x j = (ind j , m j ), with ind j = ind j and m j = m j , by invoking the encryption algorithm. For all the other positions k for which Sim 0 was not able to learn the corresponding index and payload, Sim 0 generate a ciphertext for random
Then, Sim 0 executes Adv 1 on input the challenge ciphertexts (Ct j ) j∈[ ] , where Ct j is for message x j = (ind j , m j ) as described above. When Adv 1 invokes its key-generation oracle on input key k, Sim 1 is asked to generate a corresponding secret key given k and F (k, x). Now we have the following cases:
Then we have two sub-cases: (a) If there exists and index j ∈ [ ] such that F (k, x j ) =⊥ but F (k, x j ) =⊥ then Sim 0 aborts. (b) Otherwise, Sim 1 honestly generates a secret key Sk k for key k. Notice that it holds that
If there exists an index
with high probability. Thus Sim 0 adds (j, k, F (k, x j )) to X and rewinds Adv 1 on freshly generated ciphertexts based on the information Sim 0 has collected in X so far. 
If after a query the simulator has got to rewind the adversary, we say that such query triggered a rewind. If at some point the adversary halts giving some output, then the simulator outputs what the adversary outputs. This conclude the description of the simulator Sim.
Let us first bound the probability that the simulator aborts during its simulation, this happens in cases 1.(a) or 3.(a). Let us focus on case 1.(a), the other one is symmetric. Notice that when case 1.(a) happens then F (k, x j ) =⊥ but F (k, x j ) =⊥, meaning that ind j = k and ind j = k, and that all the previous key-generation queries are good, meaning that no rewind has been triggered. Therefore, if this event happens with non-negligible probability, Adv can be used to build another adversary B that distinguishes between the encryption of x j and x j with the same probability, thus contradicting the IND-Security of the scheme. Precisely, B simulates the view to A as described before (i.e., simulating the interface with the simulator) and returns as its challenges two messages with indices ind 0 = ind j and ind 1 = ind j , where the two indices are as before. Then, B runs Adv on some ciphertext that is identical to that described before except that Ct j is set to the challenge ciphertext received from the challenger of the IND-Security game. If at some point Adv asks a query for identity ind j , then B outputs 1 as its guess, otherwise B outputs 0 as its guess. Notice that if the challenge ciphertext for B is for the challenge message with identity ind 1 = ind j , B perfectly simulated the view of A when interacting with the above simulator, and thus, by hypothesis on the non-negligible probability of occurence of the case 1.(a), B outputs 1 with non-negligible probability. On the other hand, if the challenge ciphertext is for the challenge message with identity ind 0 = ind j , then the view of Adv is completely independent from ind j , so the probability that Adv asks a query for such identity is negligible and thus B outputs 0 with overwhelming probability.
Finally, notice that the number of runs, meaning the number of times the simulator makes a rewind (a rewind happens when case 2. occurs), is upper-bounded by the number of challenge messages that is polynomial in the security parameter. In fact, every time that a query is not good and the simulator needs to rewind the adversary, the simulator learns a new pair (ind j , m j ), for some j ∈ [ ], and the same query will never cause a rewind anymore. In the last run, that in which all the key-generation queries are good, the view of the adversary is indistinguishable from that in the real game. This follows from the IND-Security of AIBE by noting that the evaluations of the secret keys on the challenge ciphertexts in the real experiment give the same values than the evaluation of the simulated secret keys on the simulated ciphertexts in the ideal experiment since the secret keys are generated honestly. Therefore, the IND-Security guarantees that in this case the view in the real experiment is indistinguishable from that in the ideal experiment.
Non-biased simulation. We stress that this is a simplified simulation and the simulator also needs to guarantee that the output is not biased. This can be made as explained in the security reduction of theorem 4.1.
E.2 Equivalence for Inner-Product over Z 2
The functionality inner-product over Z 2 (IP, for short) 8 is defined in the following way. It is a family of predicates with key space K n and index space I n consisting of binary strings of length n, and for any k ∈ K n , x ∈ I n the predicate IP(k, x) = 1 if and only if i∈[n] k i · x i = 0 mod 2.
Theorem E.2 If a predicate encryption scheme PE for IP is (poly, poly, poly)-IND-Secure then PE is (poly, poly, poly)-RSIM-Secure as well.
Proof: (Simplified simulation.) The proof follows the lines of the Theorem 4.1. For simplicity we assume that the adversary outputs a challenge message with the payload set to 1, i.e., the functionality returns values in {0, 1}, but this can be easily generalized by handling the payload as in the proof of theorem 4.1. Let x = (x 1 , . . . , x ) ∈ {0, 1} n· be the challenge index 9 output by the adversary Adv 0 and let (w i )
be the queries asked by Adv 0 (i.e. the queries asked before seeing the challenge ciphertexts). As usual we divide the execution of the simulator in runs and in any run the simulator keeps an index x 0 = (x 0 1 , . . . , x 0 ) ∈ {0, 1} n· that uses to encrypt the simulated ciphertext given to the adversary in that run. Let Y i be a matrix in {0, 1} (q 1 +i−i)×n where the rows y 1 , . . . , y q 1 +i−1 of Y i are such that the first q 1 rows y 1 , . . . , y q 1 consist of the vectors w 1 , . . . , w q 1 (i.e., y 1 = w 1 , . . . , y q 1 = w q 1 ) and for each j = 1, . . . , i − 1 the row y q 1 +j of Y i corresponds to the last query asked by Adv 1 in run j (as it will be clear soon, in any run i, if the last query asked by the adversary in such run will trigger a rewind, then only such query is put in the matrix, and not any other previous query asked by the adversary in run i). Furthermore, for any i ≥ 1 and any j ∈ [ ], let b i,j ∈ {0, 1} q 1 +i−1 be the column vector such that b i,j [k] = IP(y k , x j ), k = 1, . . . , q 1 + i − 1. During the course of the simulation, the simulator will guarantee the following invariant: at the beginning of any run i ≥ 1, for any j ∈ [ ], Y i · x 0 j = b i,j . In the first run the simulator runs the adversary with input a ciphertext that encrypts an index x 0 = (x 0 1 , . . . , x 0 ) ∈ {0, 1} n· such that for any j ∈ [ ], Y 1 · x 0 j = b 1,j . The simulator can efficiently find such vector by using the PS of IP guaranteed by Theorem D.2. When in a run i ≥ 1 the adversary makes a query for a vector y ∈ {0, 1} n we distinguish two mutually exclusive cases. executed).
1. The vector y is a linear combination of the rows of Y i . Then, by the invariant property it follows that for any j ∈ [ ], IP(y, x j ) = IP(y, x 0 j ), and the simulator continues the simulation answering the query as usual (i.e., by giving to the adversary Adv 1 the secret key for y generated honestly).
2. The vector y is not a linear combination of the rows of Y i . Then, the simulator could not be able to answer this query. In this case, we say that the query triggered a rewind and the simulator rewinds the adversary Adv 1 as follows. The simulator updates Y i+1 by adding the new row y to Y i and uses the PS of IP guaranteed by theorem D.2 to efficiently find a new vector x = (x 1 , . . . , x ) ∈ {0, 1} n· such that for any
Finally, the simulator rewinds the adversary by invoking it with input the encryption of x and updates x 0 setting it to x . Notice that at the beginning of run i + 1 the invariant is still satisfied.
At the end of the last run, the simulator outputs what the adversary outputs. It is easy to see that the simulator executes at most n runs since in any run i > 2 the rank Y i is greater than the rank of Y i−1 and for any i ≥ 1 the rank of Y i is at most n. Finally, notice that at the beginning of the last run the invariant guarantees that for any query y asked by Adv 0 and for any j ∈ [ ] IP(y, x j ) = IP(y, x 0 j ). Furthermore, since in the last run no query has triggered a rewind, then any query asked by Adv 1 in the last run still satisfies this property. Therefore, by the IND-Security of the scheme, it follows that the output of the simulator is indistinguishable from that of the adversary in the real game.
RSIM-Security for NC 0 circuits. Recall that NC 0 is the class of all family of Boolean circuits of polynomial size and constant depth with AND, OR, and NOT gates of fan-in at most 2. It is a known fact that circuits in NC 0 with n-bits input and one-bit output can be expressed as multivariate polynomials p(x 1 , . . . , x n ) over Z 2 of constant degree. Furthermore, you can encode such polynomials as vectors in Z n m 2 for some constant m and evaluate them at any point using the inner-product predicate. Therefore, it is easy to see that the previous proof implies naturally the existence of a RSIM-Secure FE scheme for any family of circuits in NC 0 but we omit the details.
Theorem E.3 If there exists predicate encryption scheme for IP that is (poly, poly, poly)-IND-Secure then there exists a predicate encryption scheme PE for any family of circuits in NC 0 that is (poly, poly, poly)-RSIM-Secure.
Despite their weakness, NC 0 circuits can be employed for many practical applications (see [BI05] ).
E.3 Equivalence for Monotone Conjunctive Boolean Formulae
The functionality Monotone Conjunctive Boolean Formulae (MCF, for short) is defined in the following way. It is a family of predicates with key space K n consisting of monotone (i.e., without negated variables) conjunctive Boolean formulae over n variables (i.e., a subset of indices in [n]) and index space I n consisting of assignments to n Boolean variables (i.e., binary strings of length n), and for any φ ∈ K n , x ∈ I n the predicate MCF(φ, x) = 1 if and only if the assigment x satisfies the formula φ. If a formula φ ⊆ [n] contains the index i, we say that φ has the i-th formal variable set.
The reader may have noticed that PE for MCF is a special case of PE for the family of all conjunctive Boolean formulae introduced by [BW07] . Though the monotonicity weakens the power of the primitive, it has still interesting applications like PE for subset queries as shown by [BW07] . We point out that the monotonicity is fundamental to implement our rewinding strategy. In fact, (under some complexity assumption) the functionality that computes the family of all conjunctive Boolean formulae is not PS 10 , so it is not clear whether an equivalence between (poly, poly, poly)-IND-Security and (poly, poly, poly)-RSIM-Security can be established for this primitive. On the other hand, weakening the functionality allowing only monotone formulae, we are able to prove the following theorem.
Theorem E.4 If a predicate encryption scheme PE for MCF is (poly, poly, poly)-IND-Secure then PE is (poly, poly, poly)-RSIM-Secure as well.
Proof Sketch. (Simplified simulation.) The proof follows the lines of the previous equivalence theorems and is only sketched outlining the differences. Let x = (x 1 , . . . , x ) be the challenge index (i.e., assignment) vector chosen by the adversary Adv 0 that the simulator does not know. The simulator can easily sample an index vector x 0 = (x 0 1 , . . . , x 0 ) such that for any i ∈ [ ], x 0 i satisfies the equations: MCF(φ, x 0 i ) = MCF(φ, x i ) for any query φ asked by Adv 0 before seeing the challenge ciphertexts. This can be done by the simulator in the following way just having the evaluations of the assignments on the formulae. In full generality, fix an arbitrary set of formulae A = {φ i } i∈ [q] and their evaluations over some (hidden) assignment x = (x 1 , . . . , x ). For any j ∈ [ ] and any position k ∈ [n], the simulator sets the k-th bit of x 0 j to be 1 or 0 according to the following rules. If there exists some φ ∈ A that has the k-th formal variable set and x j satisfies φ (the simulator has this information because it knows the evaluation of φ on x j ), then the k-th bit of x 0 j is set to 1, otherwise (i.e., whether either the k-th formal variable of φ is not set or x j does not satisfy φ) it is set to 0. It is easy to see that x 0 satisfies the previous equations with respect to the set of formulae A and thus is a valid pre-image of x. As usual, we divide the execution of the simulation in runs. During the course of the simulation, the simulator will guarantee the invariant that at the beginning of any run, the index vector x 0 satisfies all equations with respect to the (hidden) vector x and to all queries asked by the adversary. If a new query does not satisfy such equations, then the simulator has to find a new pre-image that satisfies all the equations including the new one. This is done as before by pre-sampling according to the above rules. Notice that once a bit in some index x 0 j is set to 1, it is not longer changed. Thus, it follows that the number of runs is upper bounded by the bit length of x. Therefore, if PE is IND-Secure, the simulator can conclude the simulation and produce an output indistinguishable from that of the adversary as desired.
Non-biased simulation. We stress that this is a simplified simulation and the simulator also needs to guarantee that the output is not biased. This can be made as explained in the security reduction of Theorem 4.1.
2 the random oracle model. Bellare and O'Neill [BO13] proved the (poly, poly, poly)-SIM-Security of their scheme assuming that the underlying PKE scheme is secure against key-revealing selective opening attack (SOA-K) [BDWY12] . On the other hand we prove that the construction is (poly, poly, poly)-RSIM-Secure assuming only IND-CPA PKE that is a weaker assumption than SOA-K PKE needed in [BO13] . The construction of Boneh et al. is the following. Let s = |K|−1 and K = (k 0 = , k 1 , . . . , k s ). 11 The brute force functional encryption scheme realizing F uses a semantically secure public-key encryption scheme E = (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) and works as follows: 1 , F (k 1 , x) ), . . . , E.Enc(E.pk s , F (k s , x))). Theorem E.5 Let FE be the above (poly, poly, poly)-IND-Secure functional encryption scheme for the functionality F . Then, FE is (poly, poly, poly)-RSIM-Secure as well.
Proof Sketch. (Simplified simulation.) The security reduction uses the same ideas of those in the Sections 4 and E. Roughly, the strategy of the simulator is the following. Again, we divide the execution of the simulator in runs. Let (x 1 , . . . , x ) be the vector of challenge messages chosen by the adversary and unknown to the simulator. At the beginning of the first run, the simulator executes the adversary on input ciphertexts (Ct 1 , . . . , Ct ) that encrypt dummy values. Recall that for any i ∈ [ ], Ct i [j] is supposed to encrypt F (k j , x i ). When the adversary issue a key-generation query k j , the simulator learns (F (k j , x 1 ) , . . . , F (k j , x )). Then, the simulator rewinds the adversary executing it with input a new tuple of ciphertexts (Ct 1 , . . . , Ct n ) where for each i ∈ [ ], j = 1, . . . , s, Ct i [j] encrypts F (k j , x i ). After at most s + 1 runs, the simulated ciphertext encrypts the same values as in the real game, and the simulator terminates returning the output of the adversary. This concludes the proof. 2 FE with multi-bit output. Notice that a predicate encryption scheme for predicate P implies a predicate encryption scheme for the same predicate where the payload is fixed to 1 (meaning that the predicate is satisfied). This in turn implies a functional encryption for the functionality P (where the evaluation algorithm of the FE scheme runs the evaluation algorithm of the PE scheme and outputs 0 if the PE scheme returns ⊥ and 1 otherwise). Finally, the latter implies a functional encryption scheme for the class of circuits with multi-bit output that extends P in the obvious way. These implications preserve the (poly, poly, poly)-RSIM-Security.
F Proof of Theorem 5.1
Proof: Le FE be a (0, 1, poly)-RSIM-Secure with negligible advantage functional encryption scheme for circuits with secret-key length kl(·). Let PRF = {PRF λ : {0, 1} λ × {0, 1} 2·m(λ) → {0, 1}} λ∈N a circuit family of pseudo-random functions. Let CRHF be the collision resistance hash function with range m(λ) whose key hk has been chosen by the auxiliary input generator. We omit hk in the notation just for the sake of simplicity.
For ease of presentation, henceforth, we simply talk about RSIM-Security without specifying that it is with respect with negligible advantage. Consider the following adversary Adv = (Adv 0 , Adv 1 ) and distinguisher D in the (0, 1, poly)-RSIM security experiment. Specifically, Adv works as follows: on some input, then A invokes Adv 1 on the same input. Then, when Adv 1 issues a key-generation query for a circuit C PRF,w , A sees the value w and answers such query as described above. Let p(λ) be the running time of Sim. Therefore, the execution of Sim can be divided in at most p(λ) runs, where for j = 1, . . . , p(λ), in the j-th run Sim 0 invokes its oracle on input (Ct j i ) i∈[ ] that corresponds to a key-generation query for circuit C PRF,w j , where w j = CRHF(Mpk||Ct j 1 || . . . ||Ct j ). Now notice that there exists some index k ≤ p(λ) such that w = w k and k is the first index for which w = w k . From this fact and from the fact that A checks whether w = CRHF(Mpk||Ct 1 || . . . ||Ct ), it follows that with all but negligible probability (Ct i ) = (Ct k i ). Indeed, suppose towards a contradiction that with non-negligible probability q it holds that (Ct i ) = (Ct It is easy to see that the probability that B finds a collision is exactly q. Finally, notice that, when Sim 0 invokes Adv 0 , its view is independent from the values O(r i ||w)'s. This is because, being O a truly random oracle, for any j < k, w j = w k = w and thus the values O(r i ||w j )'s are randomly and independently chosen from the values O(r i ||w)'s. Thus, the tuple of ciphertexts (Ct i ) i∈[ ] is independent from the tuple (O(r i ||w)) i∈[ ] : we call this Fact 1. We now bound the probability of the following event E which is defined to be the event that for any i ∈ [ ], Eval(Mpk, Ct i , Sk) = O(r i ||w), where the probability is taken over the random choices of A (and thus of Adv 1 and Sim) and of the oracle O. Then, it follows that when O is a truly random oracle, the probability that A O outputs 1 is negligible in the security parameter. Therefore, A O can tell apart a pseudorandom oracle from a truly random oracle with non-negligible probability. This concludes the proof.
ciphertext size, [AGVW13] exploit the fact that the simulator has to generate the secret keys before it sees the output of wPRF(x, ·). Now, notice that in the selective model the simulator generates the secret keys seeing the output of wPRF(x, ·) and the [AGVW13] 's proof argument breaks down. In fact, the results of [DIJ + 13] show that for the selective setting IND-Security implies (poly, 1, 0)-SIM-Security.
